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COMPUTING LOST FUTURE EARNINGS IN LIGHT OF
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORP. V. PFEIFER
PATRICK J. MAXWELL
I. INTRODUCTION
When an individual has been wrongfully injured, he is entitled
to be compensated for his loss.' A personal injury victim is entitled
to recover damages not only for losses suffered prior to litigation,
but also for any future losses he may be expected to incur.2 The
principal type of prospective damage is an injured plaintiff's loss of
earning capacity. Courts have discovered, however, that calculating
a disabled plaintiff's lost future earnings is no simple task.3 One of
the most troublesome questions which has plagued courts involved
in "lost earnings" computations is whether the damage award
should be adjusted to account for inflation.4 The issue of future
inflation arises because damage awards normally take the form of a
lump sum payment at the conclusion of the litigation.' If there is a
subsequent inflationary rise in prices, it decreases the purchasing
power of the money and reduces the present value of the damage
award. Normally, periodic "cost of living" wage increases act as a
hedge against inflation.' Thus, since wage increases generally fol-
low in the wake of inflation, a lump sum tort damage award for
impaired earning capacity will undercompensate an injured plain-
tiff unless it accounts for future inflation in some manner.
Traditionally, courts have refused to adjust awards based on
prospective damages to account for the impact of inflation on a
victim's lost future earnings. The principal rationale for this view
is that estimates of future inflation are too speculative to include
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a (1979). A tort damage award
should provide an injured plaintiff with a sum of money sufficient to return him to the
position he would have been in had there been no disabling injury.
2. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.8, at 1316 (1956).
3. In Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1295 (D. Conn. 1974),
Judge Blumenfeld, while engaging in an attempt to calculate a victim's lost future earnings,
was moved to state: "Nothing is more conclusively established by the instant memorandum
of decision than the difficulty of ascertaining the amount of damages due in this case .... "
4. Inflation is defined as "an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to
available goods resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1159 (1976).
5. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, § 25.2, at 1303. See also R. POSNER, Eco-
NoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.10, at 79 (1973). In theory more flexible approaches to awarding
damages, such as periodic payments, could be utilized. See generally Elligett, The Periodic
Payment of Judgments, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 130 (1979); Comment, Variable Periodic Pay-
ments of Damages: An Alternative to Lump Sum Awards, 64 IowA L. REv. 138 (1978).
6. See L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 225 (6th ed. 1974).
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as factors in computing damages.7 In recent years, however, this
traditional view has been replaced; the modern trend is for courts
to recognize the necessity of including an inflation estimate in the
computation of lost future earnings in order to avoid undercom-
pensating an injured plaintiff. The present willingness of courts to
consider inflation in awarding damages for impaired earning capac-
ity is due in large part to their realization that the inflationary spi-
ral is not a "temporary phenomenon on the American scene."8 But
predictably, the acceptance of inflation as a proper component in
the calculation of lost future earnings has posed another difficult
question: how to incorporate inflation into the damage calculus.
In the past, the United States Supreme Court has avoided the
questions of whether a damage award for lost future earnings
should be adjusted because of inflation and, if so, what method
should be employed to accomplish this task.9 In Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer,1" however, the Court granted certiorari and
for the first time directly addressed the problem of incorporating
inflation into a prospective damages award. With the Supreme
Court's decision in Pfeifer as the focal point, this study will pro-
vide an overview of the mechanics involved in computing a damage
award for future earnings, a comprehensive discussion of the vari-
ous approaches to the future inflation issue, and an assessment of
the significance of the Pfeifer opinion.
II. CASE HISTORY
In January of 1978, Howard E. Pfeifer, employed by the Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation, was injured on the job while working
as a loading helper on a coal barge." He subsequently instituted a
negligence action against his employer pursuant to section 5(b) of
7. See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 839 (1975). Penrod was later overruled by Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280
(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983).
8. Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 460 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated on
other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2541 (1983).
9. The Supreme Court has avoided the inflation issue by denying certiorari a number of
times. See Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Johnson v. Penrod
Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); In re United States
Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1970).
10. 103 S. Ct. 2541 (1983).
11. Id. at 2544. Pfeifer slipped and fell on snow and ice which had accumulated on the
gunnels of a barge.
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the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 2
The United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania held that the personal injuries sustained by Pfeifer re-
sulted from Jones & Laughlin's negligence. Further, the district
court found that the injury rendered Pfeifer completely disabled
from the date of the accident until July 1, 1979 and thereafter se-
verely restricted his capacity for performing any type of physical
labor.' 3 The district court awarded damages in the amount of
$275,881.36.1" In arriving at this figure, the court did not discount
the award to present value,' 5 nor did it increase the award to com-
pensate for future inflation. Instead, the court applied the "total
offset" method of computing damages. Under this method it is pre-
sumed as a matter of law that the rate of future inflation equals
and therefore offsets the market interest rate, making adjustments
for these factors unnecessary."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision. Recognizing the need to con-
sider inflation in future damage calculations, the Third Circuit
held that the "total offset" method was the proper federal rule
when measuring damages for lost earning capacity.' 7 Subsequently,
12. Id. As his employer, Jones & Laughlin was already obligated to compensate Pfeifer
for his injuries under § 4 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA). Pfeifer also claimed that Jones & Laughlin, as the owner pro hac vice of the
barge, was liable for negligence under § 5 of the LHWCA. Section 5(b) of the LHWCA
allows a longshoreman to institute a third-party negligence action against a vessel when the
injuries are "caused by the negligence of a vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1982).
13. The district court stated that Pfeifer could have obtained light work after July 1,
1979 and assumed he would have earned the minimum wage for the rest of his working life.
Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2545.
14. The district court arrived at the award by taking the amount of money Pfeifer would
have earned at his present wage until the date of his retirement had he not been injured
($325,312.50), subtracting his projected earnings at the minimum wage ($66,352) and the
compensation payment he had already received under § 4 of the LHWCA ($33,079.14), and
then adding $50,000 for pain and suffering. Id.
15. Id. Since damages are awarded in a lump sum at the conclusion of the litigation, a
compensated plaintiff can be expected to invest the award and earn additional money. As
Judge Posner explained: "[T]he object of discounting lost future wages to present value is to
give the plaintiff an amount of money which, invested safely, will grow to a sum equal to
those wages." O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1982).
The necessity of discounting future damages to present value was recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
16. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2545. The particular "total offset" method adopted by the trial
court was set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421
A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980). For a discussion of the "total offset" approach to calculating lost
future earnings, see infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
17. Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated on
other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2541 (1983). See generally Note, Torts-Damages-Procedure of
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the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Third Circuit's decision. 8 The Pfeifer case presented the Supreme
Court with three significant questions concerning the proper mea-
sure of damages for lost future earnings: (1) Should inflation be
considered in awarding damages for loss of earning capacity? (2) If
inflation is a proper component of the prospective damage
calculus, is the "total offset" method a permissible means of ac-
counting for the inflation factor? Specifically, does the "total off-
set" method violate the mandate of the Supreme Court in Chesa-
peake & Ohio Railway v. Kelly,19 in which the Court held that
future damage awards must be discounted to present value? (3)
Should there be an exclusive federal rule for calculating an award
for lost future earnings in an inflationary economy?
III. CALCULATING LOST FUTURE EARNINGS IN AN INFLATION-FREE
ECONOMY
The Supreme Court in Pfeifer began its analysis of the damages
issue by reviewing the manner in which lost future earnings should
be measured in a hypothetical inflation-free economy.20 The first
step in calculating an award for impaired earning capacity is ascer-
taining the amount of money the victim would have earned in his
lifetime had he not been injured. At first glance, it appears that
predicting this lost stream of income should be relatively simple.
But, as the Supreme Court in Pfeifer emphasized, computing a vic-
tim's pecuniary loss over the duration of his career can be an ex-
tremely complex endeavor, even without considering inflation.2" As
the Pfeifer opinion noted, the many different variables involved in
making such a prediction encourage both courts and litigants to
keep the lost earnings computation within manageable
proportions.22
First, the length of time in which the victim would have contin-
ued to work cannot be determined with certainty. For example, the
Discounting Damage Awards to Present Value Abandoned Under Federal Law in Order To
Account for the Effect of Future Inflation, 28 VILL. L. REV. 253 (1983).
18. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two issues: (1) Whether Jones &
Laughlin could be subject to liability under both § 4 and § 5 of the LHWCA; and (2)
Whether the Third Circuit correctly upheld the trial court's calculation of the damage
award. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2543. This comment will only address the Court's treatment of
the damages issue.
19. 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
20. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2550-51.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2549 n.11.
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victim could have been disabled in another manner at any time in
the future.2 3 As the Court in Pfeifer pointed out, in order to sim-
plify matters, the parties usually stipulate a date to which the vic-
tim would have continued to work.2' The figures used in computing
the annual income of the victim for each year of future employ-
ment are also usually the result of a compromise between the par-
ties in the name of judicial efficiency. In addition to the victim's
actual wages, he also may have been entitled to certain fringe ben-
efits, such as insurance coverage, a pension, and retirement plans.
On the other hand, the victim most likely would have incurred cer-
tain unreimbursed costs in the course of his employment, such as
transportation, meals, and other incidental expenses, which now
are avoided. Also, since damage awards are tax-free, a lost earnings
computation should be an after-tax estimate.2 5 The Supreme Court
noted that the parties in Pfeifer avoided the necessity of comput-
ing each of these variables by agreeing to presume that these mis-
cellaneous elements involved in the future lost earnings estimate
would offset each other. Only the gross wages of Mr. Pfeifer were
considered in computing his lost future earnings.26
The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that the task of calcu-
lating lost future earnings was still complicated despite the many
simplifications made by the Pfeifer litigants. Even in an inflation-
free economy, wages tend to increase over time because of what the
Court labeled "real" wage inflation.2 7 "Real" wage inflation encom-
passes a number of factors connected either to the specific individ-
ual or broader societal forces. The principal "individual" factors
23. The Court pointed out, "The probability that [the disabled worker] would still be
working at a given date is constantly diminishing." Id. at 2548. The Court noted that it is
possible to account for the "diminishing probability" doctrine in computing lost future earn-
ings. Id. at 2548 n.10. See generally Hanke, How To Determine Lost Earning Capacity, 27
PRAC. LAW. 27, 29-33 (1981).
24. In Pfeifer, the parties agreed that the plaintiff would have continued to work until
his retirement date (122 more years). 103 S. Ct. at 2549.
In other situations, the plaintiff's prior health record or other individualized circum-
stances may indicate that the plaintiff may not have worked continuously until retirement.
See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 1975) (female plaintiff
planned on working only part-time for an eight-year period so as to enable her to raise a
family). See also Comment, Inflation, Productivity, and the Total Offset Method of Calcu-
lating Damages for Lost Future Earnings, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 1003, 1004 nn.3-5 (1982) (com-
mentator criticized the practice of calculating earnings until the expected retirement age
because the "actuarial probability of survival" doctrine indicated that members of certain
demographic groups will not survive until their retirement date).
25. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
26. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2549.
27. Id.
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which tend to increase the worker's wages are experience and pro-
ductivity.28 The Supreme Court in Pfeifer explained the impact of
these interrelated factors upon a worker's wages as follows: "With
the passage of time, an individual worker often becomes more val-
uable to his employer. His personal work experiences increase his
hourly contributions to firm profits. To reflect that heightened
value, he will often receive 'seniority' or 'experience' raises, 'merit'
raises, or even promotions."2 9 The Court in Pfeifer neglected to
point out, however, that wages do not always increase in direct re-
lation to the worker's maturity.30 When a person reaches a certain
age his abilities diminish and, as a result, his wages may decrease.3
The Supreme Court in Pfeifer defined the "societal" factors
which may inflate a worker's wages as those "macroeconomic forces
that influence wages in the worker's particular industry. ' 3 In-
creased industrial productivity, for example, often leads to higher
wages for the worker.3 Other macroeconomic forces recognized by
the Court as possibly affecting the future wages of a worker are
gross national product increases and favorable collective bargain-
ing agreements. 34
After completing its illustration of the complex and potentially
cumbersome process of calculating the victim's lost income, the
Supreme Court focused upon the second and final step in comput-
ing a damage award for lost future earnings in an inflation-free
economy.3 5 The Supreme Court has long recognized that an award
for future damages must be discounted to present value so as to
28. A third personal characteristic which may also affect the future wages of the victim
is education. See Henderson, The Consideration of Increased Productivity and the Dis-
counting of Future Earnings to Present Value, 20 S.D.L. REV. 307, 312 (1975); Comment,
supra note 24, at 1004.
29. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2549. The Court noted that while these "merit" increases may
be difficult to prove they can be demonstrated in some cases. Id. Other courts have also
remarked on the difficulty of ascertaining such "merit" or "productivity" gains. See Feld-
man, 524 F.2d at 392-93; Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 672 (Alaska 1965).
30. See Henderson, Income over the Life Cycle: Some Problems of Estimation and
Measurement, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 15, 22-26 (1974).
31. Id. For an example of a "wage and age" profile used to measure such life cycle varia-
tions within particular occupations, see Comment, supra note 24, at 1004.
32. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2549 n.13. See also Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S.
156, 160 (1968) (Supreme Court upheld trial court's adjustment of a damage award for im-
paired earning capacity upon convincing evidence of steady wage increases within the par-
ticular class of workers).
33. P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMics 738-56 (10th ed. 1976).
34. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2549-50.
35. For further discussion of this basic two-step process for computing lost earnings in
the absence of inflation, see Comment, supra note 24, at 1004-05.
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avoid overcompensating the victim.3 6 This reduction to present
worth is necessary because damages are awarded in a lump sum at
the conclusion of the litigation, enabling the plaintiff to earn inter-
est on that amount in the future.3" In Chesapeake & Ohio Rail-
road v. Kelly, the decision in which the Supreme Court issued its
mandate for a reduction to present value, the Court expressly re-
fused to lay down a precise rule or formula. 8 Kelly specified only
that the rate of interest used to reduce the award to present value
should be one which could be earned on safe and unsophisticated
investments." In Pfeifer, the Supreme Court added that since the
future earnings are estimated in after-tax terms, the discount rate
also should represent an after-tax rate of return.4
The Pfeifer Court appears to have had a two-fold purpose for
examining the manner in which damages for lost future earnings
should be measured in a hypothetical inflation-free economy. First,
the Pfeifer opinion provided lower courts with an official guideline
to the mechanics involved and the factors to be considered in a
proper calculation of damages for impaired earning capacity. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the Court in Pfeifer laid the ground-
work for its subsequent consideration of the inflation issue. The
Court effectively illustrated that the computation of lost future
earnings, even without considering inflation, requires predictions of
future events which cannot be known with certainty. In sanction-
ing the computation of earnings in this manner, the court indi-
cated that the speculative nature of predicting future inflationary
trends should not be sufficient reason for refusing to include an
inflation estimate in the prospective damage calculus.
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR INFLATION
A. The Traditional Approach
Traditionally, courts have refused to consider the impact of fu-
ture price inflation in calculating prospective damage awards.41
36. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
37. "[Iun all cases where it is reasonable to suppose that interest may safely be earned
upon the amount that is awarded, the ascertained future benefits ought to be discounted in
the making up of the award." Id. at 490.
38. Id. at 491.
39. Id. at 490-91.
40. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2550. The Court noted that the arithmetic required for dis-
counting future earnings to present value can be simplified through the use of present value
tables. Id. at 2550 n.21.
41. See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
19841
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Until recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was a staunch
proponent of this traditional approach. The Fifth Circuit's opinion
in Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co.42 illustrates the justifications
typically advanced by courts refusing to consider inflation in
awarding future damages. The principal argument set forth by
Penrod and other traditionalist courts is that predictions of future
inflationary trends are too speculative to include as factors in cal-
culating damages.4 3 The Fifth Circuit in Penrod recognized that
the rate of inflation had been accelerating but maintained that
there was no proof that this inflationary trend would continue in
the future. The Penrod court reasoned that the "worsening of in-
flation might as readily foretell a recession or a depression as its
continuity.""" The court also cited the possibility that proposed
government countermeasures might halt the spiraling inflationary
trend. 5 Finally, the court stated that even if the rate of inflation
continued to increase, any resulting loss of purchasing power would
be mitigated by the higher interest rates on investments which
usually accompany inflation. 6
The traditionalists' refusal to account for inflation in future
damage awards has been described as a policy choice which em-
phasizes predictability and efficiency over accuracy. 7 It cannot be
disputed that, by ignoring inflation, traditionalist courts have sac-
rificed accuracy by undercompensating injured plaintiffs.48 But the
extent to which the traditional approach furthered predictability
U.S. 839 (1975); Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1972); Williams v.
United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970); Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 414 F.2d
305 (6th Cir. 1969). In some cases evidence of individual and societal factors which may
have led to future wage increases was allowed, but the plaintiff had to prove that these
factors were in no way influenced by predictions of future price inflation. See, e.g., Higgin-
botham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 434-45 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
42. 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975).
43. See, e.g., id. at 241; Magill, 464 F.2d at 300; Williams, 435 F.2d at 807.
44. Penrod, 510 F.2d at 236.
45. Id. One commentator noted the irony involved in such an argument: "While refusing
to acknowledge the inevitability of inflation, traditionalist courts seem more than willing to
speculate upon the effectiveness of government efforts to offset its adverse effects." Com-
ment, Future Inflation as a Factor in the Determination of Damages, 12 U. TOL. L. REV.
369, 375 (1981).
46. Penrod, 510 F.2d at 236. See also McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 42-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
47. See Comment, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63
VA. L. REV. 105, 108 (1977).
48. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1011-13 (commentator illustrated how a hypotheti-
cal accident victim in 1960 would have been grossly undercompensated under the traditional
approach to computing lost future earnings).
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and judicial efficiency is questionable. Regarding predictability, as
the Supreme Court illustrated in the Pfeifer opinion, even without
considering inflation the lost future earnings computation involves
the prediction of a number of uncertain variables. In terms of judi-
cial efficiency, calculating a lost future earnings award in a hypo-
thetical inflation-free economy is already an extremely complex
task. Thus, courts wishing to continue to adhere to the traditional
approach must question whether the minimal amount of predict-
ability and efficiency gained by ignoring inflation is worth the cost
to injured plaintiffs.
B. Modern View
In recent years, a majority of courts have chosen to reject the
traditional approach and recognize inflation as a proper component
of the future damage calculus. 49 The principal reason for this shift
is the courts' recognition that inflation is a continuing reality of
modern economic life. Therefore, failure to incorporate inflation
into prospective damage awards results in victims being undercom-
pensated.5 In Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 51 the
Second Circuit admitted that economists are not in agreement on
the question of whether inflation has become an inherent feature
of our economy, unable to be erased by government action. The
court noted, however, "[T]here is broad agreement that our econ-
omy, by its very nature, is subject to strong and persistent infla-
tionary pressures, and that the complete elimination of inflation
would require Draconian measures, at the very least."'
Under the "modern" view, courts now realize that they can "no
longer maintain their ostrich-like stance" and ignore the impact of
inflation on lost future earnings.53 The principal purpose in award-
49. See Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd on re-
hearing on other grounds, 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983); O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677
F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1982); Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975): Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp.,
516 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974);
Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967); Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa
1974); Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980).
50. See Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1982),
vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2541 (1983); Bach, 502 F.2d at 1122; Beaulieu, 434
P.2d at 671.
51. 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
52. Id. at 37.
53. Kaczkowski, 421 A.2d at 1033.
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ing tort damage awards is to compensate an injured plaintiff for
his loss. The dollar's continuing decline in purchasing power ren-
ders full compensation for the victim impossible unless the impact
of future inflation is taken into account.5 4 The traditionalist courts'
argument, that increased investment returns which accompany in-
flation provide a hedge against any decline in purchasing power of
the damage award, is not persuasive because undercompensation of
the victim still results.5 5 The Supreme Court of Alaska in Beaulieu
v. Elliot" also expressed another concern with the practice of rely-
ing on interest rates to counter inflation and provide just compen-
sation. Compensated victims might seek to counter the inflationary
effect on their lump sum award by making risky investments.
"Thus," maintained the court, "instead of being assured of earn-
ings at rates greater than the annual rate of inflation, the injured
plaintiff stands a chance of entirely losing his future earnings by
unlucky or unwise investments. '57
Courts which now adjust future damage awards to account for
inflation are not blind to the uncertainties involved in predicting
future inflationary trends.58 But this concern with speculation is no
longer viewed as a sufficient reason to continue ignoring inflation
in computing future damages. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Doca pointed out that a degree of uncertainty exists in
many facets of future damage calculations.5 " The court noted that
estimates of the future earnings of the victim and the assumption
that interest rates will continue at or above their present level in
discounting to present value both involve predictions of future
events which cannot be known with certainty. More importantly,
however, the Doca court highlighted the fact that inflation already
was being considered in one phase of the computation of damage
awards for lost earning capacity.61 Discounting future earnings to
reflect their present value "necessarily includes a prediction about
54. The Third Circuit noted that the consumer price index rose by more than 130%
from 1969 to 1980 and that the Hourly Earnings Index, which reflects wage rates in the
private, non-farm economic sector, also rose by more than 130% during the same time pe-
riod. Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 460 (citing The Report of the Commission on Executive, Legisla-
tive and Judicial Salaries (Dec. 1980)).
55. See O'Shea, 677 F.2d at 1199.
56. 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
57. Id. at 671.
58. See, e.g., Doca, 634 F.2d at 38.
59. Id. See also English, 521 F.2d at 75; Kaczkowski, 421 A.2d at 1034.
60. Doca, 634 F.2d at 37-38.
61. Id. at 38. See also O'Shea, 677 F.2d at 1199.
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inflation.""2 The market value interest rate, which traditionally has
been used in the discounting process, is comprised not only of the
lender's desired rate of return on the investment but also includes
an estimate of inflation anticipated over the term of the loan.
Thus, "modern" courts view the traditionalists' continued refusal
to consider the impact of inflation on an injured plaintiff's lost
earnings as both illogical and inequitable in light of the fact that
predictions of future inflation already are being utilized in dis-
counting those future earnings to present value. 3
C. The Supreme Court's View
Before its decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer,
the Supreme Court never had confronted directly the question of
whether future inflation should be considered in awarding prospec-
tive damages. Dictum in two previous cases, however, indicated
that the Court did approve of including inflation estimates in fu-
ture damage calculations. In a 1968 opinion, Grunenthal v. Long
Island Railroad,64 the Supreme Court upheld an award based on
anticipated wage increases that may have been attributable to in-
flation. The Grunenthal decision had little, if any, impact upon the
traditionalist refusal to consider inflation, which at that time was
still clearly the majority view. 5 One commentator explained the
Grunenthal decision's lack of precedential impact by pointing out
that the Court did not distinguish between future price inflation
and "real" wage inflation, which may also increase a worker's
wages. 6 It was further posited that the Court's failure to differen-
tiate between the two types of inflation could be attributed to the
Court's failure to realize the significance of its dictum. The
Grunenthal decision was rendered before the inflation issue had
gained prominence within the federal judiciary.67
In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt,6 8 however, the Su-
preme Court unquestionably indicated its approval of including in-
flation estimates in future damage awards. In Liepelt, the Court
62. Doca, 634 F.2d at 38.
63. Id. See also O'Shea, 677 F.2d at 1200.
64. 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
65. But see Doca, 634 F.2d at 36 (Second Circuit cited the Grunenthal decision as sup-
port for its decision to include inflation in future damage calculations).
66. Comment, supra note 47, at 111-12. For a discussion of "real" wage inflation see
supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
67. Comment, supra note 47, at 111-12.
68. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
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held that the trial court erred by excluding evidence offered by the
defendant to show the effect of income taxes on estimated future
earnings. In rejecting the argument that a reduction for future in-
come taxes would be too speculative, the Court expressly recog-
nized that trial courts have learned how to effectively deal with
"future inflation" and other "matters of estimate and prediction"
involved in damage computations. 9
By the time the Supreme Court directly addressed the question
of whether inflation should be considered in computing future
damages in Pfeifer, there existed little doubt as to how the Court
would rule. Predictably, the Supreme Court in its Pfeifer opinion
officially recognized inflation as a proper component of a damage
award for lost future earnings. "Inflation," the Court stated, "has
been a permanent fixture in our economy for many decades, and
there can be no doubt that it ideally should affect both stages of
the [lost earnings] calculation. . . -70 The Supreme Court in Pfei-
fer, as have other courts, noted the inequity under the traditional-
ist approach of discounting to present value by the market interest
rate which includes "an allowance for anticipated inflation" but re-
fusing to measure the impact of inflation on the worker's future
earnings. 1
The Court in Pfeifer rejected the traditionalist argument that
the higher interest rates accompanying inflation would sufficiently
mitigate the decrease in value of the damage award:
Although the plaintiff in such a situation could invest the pro-
ceeds of the litigation at an "inflated" rate of interest, the stream
of income that he received provided him with only enough dollars
to maintain his existing nominal income; it did not provide him
with a stream comparable to what his lost wages would have been
in an inflationary economy.72
The Pfeifer Court observed that the high rates of inflation existing
in today's economy have led to a consensus among courts that this
inequitable undercompensation of injured plaintiffs is no longer
tolerable.7
69. Id. at 494.
70. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (1983).
71. Id. at 2552 n.24 (quoting O'Shea, 677 F.2d at 1199).




While courts now generally agree that inflation should be taken
into account in computing lost future earnings, there is definitely
no "consensus" regarding the manner in which the inflation esti-
mate should be incorporated. Courts employ a number of different
methods to account for future inflation. In Pfeifer, the Supreme
Court divided the various approaches for measuring the impact of
inflation on a future damage award into three basic categories.
These methods can be referred to as follows: (1) the "inflate-dis-
count" method; (2) the "real interest rate" approach; and (3) the
"total offset" method.
A. The Inflate-Discount Method
The "inflate-discount" method seeks to avoid undercompensat-
ing the victim by increasing his expected future earnings to ac-
count for inflation and then discounting to present value by the
market interest rate.74 The extent to which the lost future earnings
should be adjusted to compensate for inflation is a factual issue.
Courts which employ the "inflate-discount" method, however, disa-
gree on the manner in which the fact finder should predict the ef-
fects of future inflation on the victim's earnings. Some courts re-
quire limited expert testimony on the question of future inflation
while others insist that the future inflation rate selected by the fact
finder be supported by competent economic evidence introduced at
trial.
1. Evidentiary Limitations
Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co.7 5 was a wrongful
death case brought under the Federal Employer Liability Act. In
Bach the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a case in
which the trial court had excluded an economist's projection of fu-
ture inflation during the time the decedent could have been ex-
pected to work. In addition, the trial court had instructed the jury
not to consider the impact of inflation in awarding damages. 76 The
Sixth Circuit held that inflation was a fact of life which the jury
must be allowed to consider in order to prevent the plaintiff from
74. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 187 (1st Cir. 1974). See also
Comment, supra note 24, at 1014-15.
75. 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974).
76. Id. at 1122.
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being undercompensated. The court, however, questioned the abil-
ity of economists to project inflation over an extended period of
time. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit ruled that such expert testi-
mony "on the exact income that the decedent would have received
through the year 2002 is so speculative . . . that it is inadmissi-
ble."' 77 The court left the prediction of the rate of future inflation,
a task it felt was too speculative to be handled by experts, to the
"common experience" of the jury.78
While the Sixth Circuit's opinion may have seemed illogical to
some, 7 9 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals approved of the Bach
decision. In Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp.0 and Johnson v.
Serra,81 the Eighth Circuit followed in the footsteps of Bach by
supporting a jury's consideration of inflation but refusing to allow
expert testimony on the issue. The Eighth Circuit prohibited ex-
pert testimony on the question of inflation "not only because it is
speculative and uncertain, but because it opens up a myriad of col-
lateral and remote considerations. 82
Subsequent decisions by both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits,
however, have revealed that these courts will not exclude all expert
testimony relating to the issue of future inflation. In Morvant v.
Construction Aggregates Corp.,83 the Sixth Circuit held that the
trial court erroneously rejected an economist's testimony regarding
the impact of inflation on the victim's future earnings. The Sixth
Circuit in Morvant explained that its Bach decision only excluded
expert testimony which sought to measure future inflation by spe-
cifically projecting an exact figure of the victim's lost future earn-
ings.84 In Taenzler v. Burlington Northern,"5 the Eighth Circuit
enunciated a similar approach. In Taenzler the court allowed ex-
pert testimony on wage increases which the victim might have ob-
tained in the future even though the prediction may have involved
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Comment, supra note 47, at 119-20 (commentator stated that the rule an-
nounced in Bach "poses the anomoly of allowing the trier of fact to consider inflation but
refusing to guide that consideration with expert evidence").
80. 516 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975).
81. 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975).
82. Riha, 516 F.2d at 844 n.4.
83. 570 F.2d 626 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
84. "What Bach aimed at preventing was a projection of statistical data so attenuated as
to be reductio ad absurdum, thus allowing damages to be ballooned beyond all rational
experience." Morvant, 570 F.2d at 632 n.5.
85. 608 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1979).
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"some indirect consideration of anticipated future inflation."86 The
Taenzler court, however, appeared to restrict such testimony to fu-
ture pay increases within a particular job classification.87 Further,
the Eighth Circuit emphasized that expert testimony projecting a
specific rate of inflation would not be allowed.88
2. No Limitations on Expert Testimony
Understandably, most courts which recognize the "inflate-dis-
count" method allow expert testimony regarding the anticipated
rate of future inflation.8 9 The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. English illustrates the rationale for
this view. In English, the court recognized that inflation should be
considered in awarding future damages but held that it would not
allow the fact finder to "arbitrarily draw an estimate of inflation
out of thin air."90 Instead the court maintained that an estimated
rate of future inflation must be supported by competent economic
evidence. 1 Contrary to the view held by the Sixth and Eighth Cir-
cuits, the Ninth Circuit obviously felt that the speculative nature
of predictions involving future inflationary trends would be mini-
mized, not increased, by the introduction of expert testimony as to
the specific rate of future inflation. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in En-
glish placed no restrictions on the utilization of expert economic
evidence in attempting to ascertain the impact of inflation on a
victim's lost earnings.
B. The Real Interest Rate Approach
A second method of incorporating inflation into a future damage
award is the "real interest rate" approach.2 Courts employing this
86. Id. at 800.
87. Id. at 801.
88. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Taenzler set forth three reasons for refusing to allow ex-
pert testimony predicting a specific rate of future inflation: (1) such evidence is "more pre-
cise than present knowledge warrants"; (2) a specific rate of inflation "may present a fore-
shortened picture that puts future earnings out of perspective," thereby possibly resulting in
an outrageously large damage award; (3) such expert testimony "tends to open up collateral
matters which may create unmanageable trials." Id.
89. See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 298 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd
on rehearing on other grounds, 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983); O'Shea v. Riverway Towing
Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1982); Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1378 (10th
Cir. 1977); United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75-76 (9th Cir. 1975); Tenore v. Nu Car
Carriers, Inc., 341 A.2d 613, 620-21 (N.J. 1975).
90. English, 521 F.2d at 75.
91. Id. at 75-76.
92. The Supreme Court pointed out that this method of accounting for the impact of
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method focus upon the economic concept that the market interest
rate is comprised of two components: (1) the market's own estima-
tion of anticipated rates of inflation over the life of the investment;
and (2) the "real" rate of return a lender would demand if no infla-
tion were anticipated." The "real" interest rate is perceived as re-
maining virtually constant, somewhere between one and three per-
cent. Any shift in market interest rates is said to result from
fluctuations in the "inflationary expectation" component. Applying
these economic principles, courts adhering to the "real interest
rate" approach conclude that the inflationary impact on an injured
plaintiff's future earnings will be perfectly offset by the "inflation-
ary expectation" component of the market interest rate. 4 Thus, in
computing the future damage award, the estimated future earnings
are discounted only by the "real" interest rate.
The leading proponent of the "real interest rate" method is the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In Feldman v. Allegheny Air-
lines, Inc.,95 a diversity wrongful death action brought under Con-
necticut law, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's use of a
1.5% "inflation adjusted" discount rate.9 6 However, the court re-
fused to endorse this method of accounting for inflation over other
methods; the court stated only that it agreed "with the district
court's interpretation of Connecticut law as leaving open the ques-
tion of how inflation may be accounted for in such damages.''e
The Second Circuit was not as restrained in Doca v. Marina
Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A.9 8 Doca was a personal injury action
arising under the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. In Doca, the Second Circuit approved use of
the "real interest rate" method. Expressing concern with the spec-
ulative nature of future inflation estimates, the court cited the
Feldman decision as an example of how to account for inflation
without making any prediction of specific future inflation rates."
future inflation is utilized by other common law countries. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2552.
93. Id. at 2553.
94. See O'Shea, 677 F.2d at 1199; Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d
30, 39 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
95. 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975).
96. The expert, upon whom the trial judge in Feldman relied, arrived at this discount
rate by subtracting the average yearly inflation rate set out in the Department of Labor's
Consumer Price Index over the prior 18-year period (2.87%) from the annual interest to be
derived from a prudent, nonsophisticated investment (4.14%). The 1.27% difference was
rounded off to 1.5%. Id. at 387.
97. Id.
98. 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
99. Doca, 634 F.2d at 39.
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The court pointed out that the "real interest rate" approach of
Feldman focused only on the relationship between the inflation
rate and the interest rate. In addition to minimizing speculation,
the Second Circuit noted that utilizing an inflation adjusted dis-
count rate enhances judicial efficiency by simplifying the future in-
flation issue. 100
The Second Circuit in Doca recognized that considerable disa-
greement exists among economists as to the validity of the basic
premise underlying the "adjusted discount rate" approach. The as-
sumption is that the "real" rate of interest is constant and there-
fore independent of inflation."' But the court relied on the fact
that "substantial opinion" supports the view that the "real" yield
of money remains relatively constant at approximately two percent
during periods of stable inflation. 102 The Second Circuit suggested,
therefore, that a two percent discount rate would "normally be fair
to both sides."'' 03
While expressing approval of the "real interest rate" approach,
the Second Circuit in Doca did not require its use, allowing liti-
gants to account for inflation through other means. 40 Other courts
which have recognized the legitimacy of the "real interest rate"
method also have refused to establish this approach as the exclu-
sive means of accounting for inflation in awarding future dam-
ages. 0 5 The primary consideration of the Second Circuit, as well as
100. Id.
101. Id. at 39 n.10.
102. Id. at 39. In O'Shea, 677 F.2d at 1199, Judge Posner stated that the "real" interest
rate should normally remain between one and three percent.
103. Doca, 634 F.2d at 39. The Second Circuit expressed the view that a two percent
discount rate would be fair not only in periods of stable inflation but also during times of
unusually high inflation rates:
It may well be that during periods of unusually high inflation rates, interest rates
will lag somewhat behind the inflation rate, at least temporarily, with the result
that the interest return on a discounted lump sum award will not fully keep pace
with inflation. But in such periods of high inflation, wages too will not keep pace
with inflation. . . .[A] present value discount rate normally need not be reduced
below 2% just to compensate for unusually high inflation. To do so would ignore
the basic objective of selecting a present sum of money that will replace what the
future wages would have been.
Id. at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
104. Id. at 40. The Second Circuit did, however, authorize trial courts to utilize a two
percent inflation adjusted discount rate if the litigants elected not to introduce evidence on
the questions of inflation and reduction to present worth. Id.
105. See Culver, 688 F.2d at 308-10 (Fifth Circuit on rehearing recently reversed its view
in Culver in light of the Supreme Court's Pfeifer decision and established the "real interest
rate" approach as the exclusive method absent a stipulation by the parties. Culver v. Slater
Boat Co., 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983)); O'Shea, 677 F.2d at 1200.
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other courts which allow litigants a choice of methods, appears to
be that inflation be considered in computing future damages, not
that it be accounted for in any particular manner.10 6
C. The Total Offset Method
The third and final method of accounting for inflation is the "to-
tal offset" approach. The "total offset" method departs from the
long-recognized practice of discounting future earnings to present
value. This approach assumes as a matter of law that the market
interest rate, normally used to discount damage awards, is com-
pletely offset by certain elements involved in computing a victim's
lost stream of future income. All courts which have employed this
method agree that future price inflation contributes to this offset.
Courts differ, however, on the question of which other elements in
the lost future earnings computation, if any, should be included in
the offset.
The "total offset" approach was first enunciated by the Supreme
Court of Alaska in Beaulieu v. Elliott.10 In Beaulieu, the court
held that the market interest rate was totally offset by price infla-
tion and "real" wage inflation, thereby making it unnecessary to
discount the victim's future earnings to present value. 10 8 Sensing
future criticism of its abandonment of the widely recognized prac-
tice of discounting to present value, the Alaska court argued that
its "total offset" method would not overcompensate, and, in real-
ity, might even undercompensate an injured plaintiff by eliminat-
ing all sources of future wage increases from the prospective dam-
age calculus. 109 Perhaps realizing that its "total offset" formula
may lean too much toward undercompensating injury victims, the
Alaska court slightly altered its Beaulieu approach in State v.
Guinn. 10 In Guinn, the court held: "Automatic step increases
keyed to [the victim's] length of service are by their very nature
certain and predictable at the time of trial, and they should be
considered in a judicial estimation of lost future earnings.""'
Thus, after Guinn, "certain and predictable" individual wage in-
106. The Second Circuit in Doca, 634 F.2d at 34, noted that computations of lost future
earnings utilizing either the "inflate-discount" or the "real interest rate" approach should
yield nearly identical results.
107. 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
108. Id. at 671-72.
109. Id. at 672.
110. 555 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976).
111. Id. at 546.
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creases such as seniority gains are not included to offset the mar-
ket interest rate.
Initially, other courts rejected the "total offset" method set forth
by the Supreme Court of Alaska." 2 Their skepticism concerning
this approach primarily was attributable to two factors: (1) a belief
that the "total offset" method was an imprecise oversimplifica-
tion;113 and (2) sentiment among the courts, especially federal
courts, that the "total offset" method's failure to discount to pre-
sent value violated the mandate of the Supreme Court in Chesa-
peake v. Ohio Railroad v. Kelly. 14
In 1980, thirteen years after the Beaulieau decision, another
court finally was persuaded to endorse the "total offset" approach.
In Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz,11 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
followed the example set by its Alaskan counterpart and adopted
the "total offset" method as the exclusive means of accounting for
inflation in awarding future damages. The court, however, refused
to embrace the particular formula advanced by the Alaska court.
The Kaczkowski decision was especially critical of the Alaska
court's refusal to consider future "merit" increases, maintaining
that such a position "unfairly discriminates against those victims
whose salary is dependant on their skill, experience, and value to
their employer."11 The Pennsylvania court in Kaczkowski ad-
vanced the view that future inflation alone should completely off-
set the market interest rate."' Kaczkowski, therefore, stands for
the proposition that an injured plaintiff should be able to intro-
duce evidence bearing on all sources of future wage increases ex-
cept for price inflation.
Unlike the Supreme Court of Alaska in Beaulieau and Guinn,
the Pennsylvania court in Kaczkowski sought to support its selec-
tion of the "total offset" method with economic theory.11 8 Relying
112. See, e.g., United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Meier v. Bray,
475 P.2d 587, 590 n.1 (Or. 1970).
113. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1292 n.26 (D. Conn.
1974) (Beaulieu decision was characterized as reflecting "exceptional conditions of inflation
in a 'frontier' state"), afl'd, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Comment, supra note 47,
at 128.
114. See Taenzler v. Burlington N., 608 F.2d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1979); English, 521 F.2d
at 75; Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 414 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1969).
115. 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980).
116. Id. at 1037.
117. Id.
118. As one commentator has observed, the Alaska court's decision to adopt the "total
offset" method "was based on a common sense understanding of the economy, rather than
on careful economic exposition .. " Comment, supra note 24, at 1018 n.69.
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upon the economic concept known as the "Fisher effect,"
Kaczkowski maintained that future inflation rates and future in-
terest rates "co-vary significantly."" 9 Thus, the court concluded
that "since over the long run interest rates, and, therefore, the dis-
count rates, will rise and fall with inflation, we shall exploit this
natural adjustment by offsetting the two factors in computing lost
future earning capacity."' 0 The Kaczkowski court noted that the
economic soundness of the "total offset" method assured as much,
if not more, accuracy than the "real interest rate" method of mea-
suring future inflation. Further, the court pointed out that the "to-
tal offset" method is superior in terms of judicial efficiency and
predictability because it eliminates the need to predict future in-
flation and future interest rates.' 2 '
VI. Pfeifer
A. The Third Circuit
In Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,22 the Third Circuit
became the first federal court of appeals to sanction the use of the
"total offset" method. Citing the need for a uniform federal rule in
cases arising under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary, the court of appeals held that the district court
properly applied the "total offset" method as the federal rule of
damages.12 3 Relying heavily on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Kaczkowski, the Third Circuit declared that the "total
119. Kac2kowski, 421 A.2d at 1037. Modern-interest theoretician Irving Fisher set forth
the economic theory upon which the Kaczkowski court relied to support its selection of the
"total offset" method:
[W]hen prices are rising, the rate of interest tends to be high but not so high as
it should be to compensate for the rise; and when prices are falling, the rate of
interest tends to be low, but not so low as it should be to compensate for the fall.
Id. (quoting I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 43 (1930)). For further discussion of the
"Fisher effect" as it relates to the "total offset" method, see Comment, supra note 47, at
128-33.
120. Kaczkowski, 421 A.2d at 1037-38.
121. Id. at 1038.
122. 678 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 461. The trial court's opinion in Pfeifer is unclear as to whether it erroneously
applied the state law of Pennsylvania, specifically the Kaczkowski decision, rather than fed-
eral law by utilizing the "total offset" method. See Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
Case No. 79-1597 (W.D. Pa. 1981). The Third Circuit dismissed Jones & Laughlin's argu-
ment on this point, holding that the issue had not been preserved for review. The court of
appeals did, however, express the view that the district court had in fact decided the case
under federal law, maintaining that "[ult is not unusual for a federal court to borrow sub-
stantive state law and adopt it as federal law." Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 456-57.
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offset" method allows a court to account for inflation without suc-
cumbing to speculation: "The total offset method avoids the dan-
ger of speculating as to the future rate of inflation by making what
we consider a very sensible accommodation: it assumes that in the
long run the effects of future inflation and the discount rate will
co-vary significantly with the other.' 1 24 The Third Circuit in Pfei-
fer maintained that the "total offset" method's basic assumption,
that the rate of future inflation will equal future interest rates, is
"no better or no worse than the varying prognostications of expert
witnesses.' 25 In addition, the court was impressed with the man-
ner in which the "total offset" approach furthered the goals of ju-
dicial efficiency and predictability. Finally, the court advanced the
view that the "total offset" method embodies "the continued re-
quirement of reduction to present worth" and, therefore, does not
violate the requirement of discounting future damages to present
value set forth in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Kelly by the Su-
preme Court. 26
B. The Supreme Court
The Pfeifer case presented the Supreme Court with the opportu-
nity to resolve the confusion existing among the lower federal
courts regarding the proper method on incorporating inflation into
a damage award for lost future earnings. Each of the litigants and
amici in the case attempted to persuade the Court to adopt a par-
ticular method. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, as the peti-
tioner, and various amici sought to convince the Court to reject the
"total offset" method in favor of one of the other approaches. 27
They argued that the "total offset" method violated the Kelly re-
quirement of discounting future damage awards to present value,
124. Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 461.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Brief for Petitioner at 7 (argued that the Court should adopt the "inflate-discount"
method as set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Taenzler; see supra notes 85-88 and accompa-
nying text); Brief Amicus Curiae of Alcoa Steamship Company at 13-14 (set forth a hybrid
method which combines characteristics of the "real interest rate" and "inflate-discount" ap-
proaches); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12 (argued that the Court should
accept either the "real interest rate" or the "inflate-discount" approach); Brief for South-
eastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority as Amicus Curiae at 19 (argued that all evi-
dence in regard to inflation and its impact on lost future earnings should be limited to the
particular plaintiff, occupation, and geographic area and that no evidence of general nation-
wide inflationary trends or rates be allowed).
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thereby providing the plaintiff with an unwarranted windfall." On
the other hand, the respondent, Howard Pfeifer, maintained that
the "total offset" method of computing future damages did not vi-
olate the Supreme Court's discounting mandate in Kelly and in
fact provided a more favorable result to a defendant than the "real
interest rate" approach. 29 Further, Pfeifer advocated that the
Court endorse the "total offset" approach as the proper means of
computing future damages under federal law as the most efficient
and predictable method of incorporating inflation into the future
damage award.130
After reviewing the various approaches proposed by the parties
and amici, the Supreme Court concluded that it should not estab-
lish one method as the exclusive federal rule for incorporating in-
flation into a damage award for lost future earnings. The Court
was convinced that the complexity and uncertainty involved in
computing a future damage award dictated against requiring one
particular approach. The court made three observations which led
to this conclusion:
First, by its very nature the calculation of an award for lost earn-
ings must be a rough approximation .... Second, sustained price
inflation can make the award substantially less precise....
Third, the question of lost earnings can arise in many different
contexts. In some sectors of the economy, it is far easier to assem-
ble evidence of an individual's most likely career path than in
others. 1 '
While the Supreme Court in Pfeifer refused to select one
method as the mandatory federal rule, the Court did assess the
various approaches and rendered an opinion as to the desirability
of employing each. The first approach analyzed by the Court was
128. It was maintained that utilization of a "total offset" approach would result in
overcompensating an injuried plaintiff for two reasons: (1) interest rates on safe investments
are generally higher than the rate of inflation, and (2) wage increases do not usually keep
pace with rises in the Consumer Price Index. See Brief for Petitioner at 22; Brief Amicus
Curiae of Alcoa Steamship Company at 11; Brief Amicus Curiae for Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania Transportation Authority at 15. Petitioner and supporting amici derived these criti-
cisms of the "total offset" method from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Culver v. Slater Boat
Co., 688 F.2d 280, 297-99 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 722 F.2d 144
(5th Cir. 1983).
129. See Brief for Respondent at 21.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2555. The Court did not express any concern for uniformity in
the federal law of damages in maritime cases with regard to the method of accounting for
inflation in computing a victim's lost future earning.
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the "inflate-discount" method, whereby the victim's expected fu-
ture earnings are increased to account for inflation and then dis-
counted to present value by the market interest rate. The Court
concluded that the specific forecasts of future inflation rates em-
ployed by this approach are "too unreliable to be useful in many
cases" and therefore that attempts to make such predictions will
normally be "costly and . . . unproductive."13 Thus, for efficiency
and accuracy reasons, the Court "discouraged" both litigants and
courts from utilizing the "inflate-discount" method."'
The Supreme Court also was unenthusiastic about the "real in-
terest rate" approach, in which the plaintiff's lost future earnings
are calculated without considering inflation and then reduced to
present worth by an "inflation adjusted" discount rate. The Court
was unconvinced of the validity of the essential premise underlying
this method-that the "real" interest rate is relatively stable over
time."" Nevertheless, the Supreme Court maintained that a court
adopting this approach would not be reversed if it used a discount
rate "between one and three percent and explain[ed] its choice."'3
The third and final method of computing future damages in an
inflationary economy discussed by the Court in Pfeifer was the
"total offset" approach. Remarking that "such an approach has the
virtue of simplicity and may even be economically precise," the Su-
preme Court appeared to find the "total offset" method the most
attractive means of incorporating inflation into a damage award for
lost future earnings."" The Court, however, did not agree with the
132. Id. at 2556. "The average accident trial should not be converted into a graduate
seminar on economic forecasting." Id. (quoting Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense,
S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981)).
133. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2556. The Supreme Court appears to have ignored the varia-
tion of the "inflate-discount" method which forbids expert testimony seeking to predict spe-
cific rates of future inflation. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text. The Court may
have had a more favorable view of such an approach excluding expert testimony.
134. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2556. In questioning the economic soundness of the "real in-
terest rate" approach, the Court noted that economist Irving Fisher advanced the view that
the "real" interest rate is not stable because changes in the "anticipated inflation" compo-
nent of the market interest rate lag behind actual changes in inflation. The Court pointed
out that Fisher had computed the "real" rate of interest in 1917 and found it to have fallen
below minus 70%. Id. at 2556 n.30.
135. Id. at 2556.
136. Id. at 2557. In the Pfeifer opinion, the Court focused upon a "total offset" formula
set forth by Professor Carlson in which the market discount rate would be deemed offset by
price inflation and the societal factors contributing to "real" wage inflation. (This "total
offset" formula is similar but not identical to the one set forth by the Supreme Court of
Alaska in Beaulieu and Guinn.) The Court went on to note that "a substantial body of
literature suggests that the Carlson rule might even undercompensate some plaintiffs." Id.
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Third Circuit's view that this approach should be established as a
mandatory federal rule. Noting that litigants could stipulate to the
use of a "total offset" formula before trial, the Court emphasized
that it was "not prepared to impose it on unwilling litigants, for we
have not been given sufficient data to judge how closely the na-
tional patterns of wage growth are likely to reflect the patterns
within any given industry. ' 137 Congress, according to the Court,
was better equipped to undertake the comprehensive economic
analysis needed before establishing a mandatory federal rule.138
Since the record revealed that the parties had not agreed to utilize
the "total offset" method, the Court vacated the judgment of the
Third Circuit and remanded the action back to the trial court for
recomputation of the plaintiff's lost future earnings. 39
The Supreme Court's decision in Pfeifer clearly evidences the
continuing vitality of the Kelly mandate. A defendant is still enti-
tled, at least in the federal court system, to discount any ascer-
tained future damages to present value. A litigant cannot be forced
to accept the "theoretical" reduction to present worth embodied in
the "total offset" method. While the Pfeifer decision clearly pro-
hibits lower federal courts from imposing the "total offset" on un-
willing litigants, it does give courts the discretion of employing one
of the two approaches which involve an actual discounting to pre-
sent value. The only requirement set forth by the Supreme Court
in Pfeifer regarding utilization of the "inflate-discount" or "real
interest rate" methods is that "the discount rate should be chosen
on the basis of the factors that are used to estimate the lost stream
of future earnings."' 40
at 2557 n.31 (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 2557. In Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on
rehearing on other grounds, 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
expressed a similar concern in refusing to embrace the "total offset" method. The Fifth
Circuit noted that "the purpose of the award for future lost wages is not to protect the
plaintiff from future inflation" but rather "to replace for future wages actually lost." Culver,
688 F.2d at 307. Recognizing that the wage increases of many workers do not keep pace with
inflation, the court felt that the application of an inflexible "total offset" formula would
result in overcompensating plaintiffs and unnecessarily penalizing defendants. Id. at 297-99.
138. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2557.
139. Id. at 2557-58.
140. Id. at 2556. The Supreme Court in Pfeifer, 103 S.Ct. at 2555, expressly limited its
decision to suits arising under § 5(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act. Clearly, however, the broad language and rationale employed by the Court in
regard to the proper method of incorporating future inflation estimates into damage compu-
tations should be applicable to all actions involving awards of lost earnings. See Murdock,
Pfeifer: The Supreme Court on LHWCA and Inflation, 25 FOR DEF., Sept. 1983, at 14.
LOST FUTURE EARNINGS
VII. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pfeifer, most courts
which had addressed the issue recognized the necessity of consider-
ing inflation in awarding future damages. Thus, the Pfeifer Court's
official recognition of inflation as a proper component of future
damage awards should have little impact on the manner in which
lost future earnings are calculated. The Pfeifer decision should,
however, have a significant effect on the procedure by which courts
incorporate inflation into the damage calculus. Clearly, after Pfei-
fer the "total offset" method cannot be utilized by federal courts
unless the parties stipulate to its use. Although the Court in Pfei-
fer was not overly enthusiastic about either of the remaining two
alternatives, it was especially critical of the "inflate-discount" ap-
proach. The Court went so far as to expressly discourage litigants
and courts from employing this method. Thus, it is likely that the
''real interest rate" approach will enjoy more widespread use
within the federal judiciary.
The impact of the Pfeifer decision, however, should extend be-
yond the federal court system. The Supreme Court in Pfeifer
clearly implied that, when compared to the other available meth-
ods, a "total offset" formula is the best method of computing dam-
ages for lost future earnings in an inflationary economy. Although
the Supreme Court refused to impose such an inflexible method
upon unwilling litigants, the Court's favorable view of this ap-
proach could conceivably induce state courts to adopt a "total off-
set" formula.
State courts wishing to embrace a "total offset" formula for com-
puting lost future earnings should have little difficulty in dis-
missing the Supreme Court's stated rationale for its refusal to do
so. The Supreme Court in Pfeifer expressed concern with the fact
that it could not determine how closely the national patterns of
wage growth, utilized by the "total offset" approach, parallel wage
increases within a particular industry. The Court, however, ap-
pears to have ignored its own description of the lost earnings dam-
age calculus. In the Pfeifer decision, the Court stated: "Through-
out this opinion we have noted the many rough approximations
that are essential under any manageable approach to an award for
lost earnings.''41 It is not unreasonable to assume that national
wage growth patterns bear "rough approximation" to those within
141. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2558 n.34.
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the particular industry of an injured plaintiff. For some unstated
reason, the Supreme Court in Pfeifer felt that official recognition
of the "total offset" method would result in one approximation too
many.
